Le réalisme scientifique et la métaphysique des sciences

Résumé: Cet article prend pour point de départ les réponses réalistes majeures aux défis de la sous-détermination et de l'incommensurabilité. Ces réponses servent de base épistémologique au projet visant à construire une métaphysique des sciences qui réunit les connaissances scientifiques dans une conception cohérente et complète de la nature. Ce projet accorde une position privilégiée aux théories physiques fondamentales. Dans ce contexte, l'article se focalise sur les distinctions entre, d'une part, propriétés intrinsèques et relations et, d'autre part, propriétés catégoriques et propriétés causales, montrant comment les théories physiques fondamentales contemporaines soutiennent la position métaphysique du réalisme structura

Some comments on "The Mathematical Universe"

I discuss some problems related to extreme mathematical realism, focusing on a recently proposed "shut-up-and-calculate" approach to physics (arXiv:0704.0646, arXiv:0709.4024). I offer arguments for a moderate alternative, the essence of which lies in the acceptance that mathematics is (at least in part) a human construction, and discuss concrete consequences of this--at first sight purely philosophical--difference in point of view.Comment: 11 page

The structure of causal sets

More often than not, recently popular structuralist interpretations of physical theories leave the central concept of a structure insufficiently precisified. The incipient causal sets approach to quantum gravity offers a paradigmatic case of a physical theory predestined to be interpreted in structuralist terms. It is shown how employing structuralism lends itself to a natural interpretation of the physical meaning of causal sets theory. Conversely, the conceptually exceptionally clear case of causal sets is used as a foil to illustrate how a mathematically informed rigorous conceptualization of structure serves to identify structures in physical theories. Furthermore, a number of technical issues infesting structuralist interpretations of physical theories such as difficulties with grounding the identity of the places of highly symmetrical physical structures in their relational profile and what may resolve these difficulties can be vividly illustrated with causal sets.Comment: 19 pages, 4 figure

Analytic Metaphysics versus Naturalized Metaphysics: The Relevance of Applied Ontology

The relevance of analytic metaphysics has come under criticism: Ladyman & Ross, for instance, have suggested do discontinue the field. French & McKenzie have argued in defense of analytic metaphysics that it develops tools that could turn out to be useful for philosophy of physics. In this article, we show first that this heuristic defense of metaphysics can be extended to the scientific field of applied ontology, which uses constructs from analytic metaphysics. Second, we elaborate on a parallel by French & McKenzie between mathematics and metaphysics to show that the whole field of analytic metaphysics, being useful not only for philosophy but also for science, should continue to exist as a largely autonomous field

Unsharp Quantum Reality

The positive operator (valued) measures (POMs) allow one to generalize the notion of observable beyond the traditional one based on projection valued measures (PVMs). Here, we argue that this generalized conception of observable enables a consistent notion of unsharp reality and with it an adequate concept of joint properties. A sharp or unsharp property manifests itself as an element of sharp or unsharp reality by its tendency to become actual or to actualize a specific measurement outcome. This actualization tendency-or potentiality-of a property is quantified by the associated quantum probability. The resulting single-case interpretation of probability as a degree of reality will be explained in detail and its role in addressing the tensions between quantum and classical accounts of the physical world will be elucidated. It will be shown that potentiality can be viewed as a causal agency that evolves in a well-defined way

Realism and Objectivism in Quantum Mechanics

The present study attempts to provide a consistent and coherent account of what the world could be like, given the conceptual framework and results of contemporary quantum theory. It is suggested that standard quantum mechanics can, and indeed should, be understood as a realist theory within its domain of application. It is pointed out, however, that a viable realist interpretation of quantum theory requires the abandonment or radical revision of the classical conception of physical reality and its traditional philosophical presuppositions. It is argued, in this direction, that the conceptualization of the nature of reality, as arising out of our most basic physical theory, calls for a kind of contextual realism. Within the domain of quantum mechanics, knowledge of 'reality in itself', 'the real such as it truly is' independent of the way it is contextualized, is impossible in principle. In this connection, the meaning of objectivity in quantum mechanics is analyzed, whilst the important question concerning the nature of quantum objects is explored.Comment: 20 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:0811.3696, arXiv:quant-ph/0502099, arXiv:0904.2702, arXiv:0904.2859, arXiv:0905.013

Realism about the Wave Function

A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the \emph{sui generis} interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics.Comment: Penultimate version for Philosophy Compas